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The Iraqi Use Of Chemical Weapons
Against The Kurds: A Case Study In The
Regulation Of Chemical Weapons In
International Law
I. Introduction
"Unless the world family of nations stands firm against the use
of poison gas, that dreadful weapon could become increasingly com-
mon in regional conflicts."' The world has experienced a prolifera-
tion in the production and use of chemical weapons in the past two
to three decades.' There have been numerous incidents of chemical
weapon employment throughout the world, especially in the Iran-
Iraq War. This frequent use has resulted in the breakdown of the
moral prohibitions that have held the horrors of chemical weapons in
check for the last seventy years.' The taboo on the use of chemical
weapons has been weakened, if not destroyed. No better evidence of
this phenomenon exists than Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's re-
cent threat to use chemical weapons in the current Persian Gulf
crisis.4
Iraq frequently employed chemical weapons against Iran during
the Persian Gulf War; even more horrific was its use of these weap-
ons against its own population.5 During 1988 Iraq used poison gas on
1. Smolowe, Where is the Outrage?, TIME, Sept. 26, 1988, at 36.
2. ASSOCIATION OF THE U.S. ARMY, CHEMICAL WARFARE - A REAL AND GROWING
THREAT (Special Report 1989). The following countries are known to have or are strongly
suspected of having chemical weapons: U.S., U.S.S.R., France, Israel, Egypt, Ethiopia, China,
North Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Burma, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. It is likely that the
following countries have chemical weapons: Libya, Somalia, Cuba, Chile, Pakistan, Thailand,
Republic of Korea and South Africa. Id.
3. D. HARRISON & J. ROBERTS, UNITED STATES NATIONAL STRATEGY AND DEFENSE
POLICY OBJECTIVES AFTER CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT at I (U.S. Army War College Study
Project, March 19, 1989) [hereinafter HARRISON & ROBERTS].
4. Daily Telegraph (London), Sept. 7, 1990, at A25, col. 3. In early August, 1990, Iraq
invaded Kuwait. Within twelve hours Kuwait was brought to its knees by Iraq's proficient war
machine. Iraqi motives for invading included money and regional dominance. Beyer, Iraq's
Power Grab, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 16, col. 1. A few weeks later, Iraq was surrounded by a
multi-national force based in Saudia Arabia and was isolated by a United Nations-sponsored
naval blockade. George Bush, Diplomat, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 10, 1990 at 26.
Hussein's threat to use chemical weapons is not an idle one. Iraq has deployed chemical
weapons with its forces occupying Kuwait. It also has an estimated 200 long-range missiles
capable of launching a chemical weapons strike from within Iraq. Missile Strike Against Iraq
Mulled On Hill, Washington Times, Sept. 10, 1990, at A6, col. 4.
5. UN Team Says Chemical Agent Used in Gulf War, Washington Post, March 27,
1984, at Al, col. 5. Iraq used chemical weapons repeatedly against Iran during the war.
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its Kurdish population a number of times, with horrifying results.
Iraq's March 1988 bombing of the city of Halabja with mustard gas,
cyanide gas and nerve gas left hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
bloated Kurdish bodies littering the streets.7 No country has chal-
lenged these major acts of genocide.8 In spite of the senseless brutal-
ity of the Iraqis, the world has remained strangely silent. This si-
lence gives the impression of indifference.9 It also suggests that
chemical warfare is acceptable, especially against a minority group
such as the Kurds.
The Kurds are a non-Arab ethnic group with a distinct lan-
guage, culture and history.10 The Kurds number about twenty mil-
lion." They inhabit a vast mountain area, popularly known as Kur-
distan, that stretches from Turkey through northern Iraq into Iran,
and includes small areas of Syria and the Soviet Union." The Kurds
are fierce, combative mountain people who have been fighting for a
nation of their own for centuries."3
This Comment will examine the international law regulating
chemical weapons and apply that law to the Iraqis' use of chemical
weapons against their own population in a civil war. Specifically, this
Comment will analyze and highlight the shortcomings of interna-
tional conventions, customary international law, and general princi-
ples of law dealing with chemical weapons. The main focus will be
on the inadequacies of the The Geneva Protocol of 1925.'1 The Pro-
tocol does not address the use of chemical weapons directed against
dissident domestic elements.' 5 It also lacks any compliance provi-
Bombings in January and February, 1986, resulted in the treatment of 8500 casualties, 2500
of whom were hospitalized suffering from sulfur mustard burns. The U.N. has documented six
instances of chemical weapons use. Id.
6. Pitt. Post-Gazette, Sept. 26, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
7. Smolowe, Return of the Silent Killer, TIME, Aug. 22, 1988, at 46. Halabja was a
thriving trading center in northeastern Iraq and was the center of Kurdish resistance. U.S.
NEws & WORLD REPORT, April 4, 1988, at 11.
8. Smolowe, supra note 7, at 47.
9. Obtaining international censure is difficult in the context of chemical warfare. Na-
tions that are not directly involved find it easier to ignore the allegations rather than pursue
them, especially if there is no direct evidence of the usage. Note, Establishing Violations of
International Law: "Yellow Rain" and the Treaties Regulating Chemical and Biological War-
fare, 35 STAN. L. REv. 257, 285 (1983).
10. Sciolino, Kurdish Chief Gains Support In U.S. Visit, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1988, at
A3, col. 1.
11. Id. at A3, col. 2.
12. Id.
13. Barnes, Kurds Locked In One More Losing War?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
Nov. 9, 1987, at 55. The Kurds are one of the largest nations in the contemporary world still
denied an independent state. Some regard this continuing struggle as a romantic cause while
others find it futile and doomed to failure. A. HYMAN, ELUSIVE KURDISTAN: THE STRUGGLE
FOR RECOGNITION 1 (Conflict Studies No. 214, Sept. 1988).
14. Geneva Protocol of 1925, 26 US.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.TS. 65.
15. Id. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 states that "the use in war of asphyxiating, poison-
ous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly con-
demned by the general opinion of the civilized world" and that the "high contracting parties
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sions. There has been no other significant multilateral agreement on
chemical weapons since 1925, although a forty-nation Conference on
Disarmament has been meeting in Geneva since 1984 to draft a total
ban on chemical weapons.16
This Comment also analyzes -the applicability of the Geneva
Protocol and customary international law to military action directed
against rebellious elements within a country. 17 Some scholars have
deemed the prohibition against using chemical weapons to be a dec-
laration of customary international law, especially the customary
laws of war, which would also apply to non-international conflicts.18
The Iraqi actions against the Kurds are also a grave violation of in-
ternational humanitarian law, specifically, the United Nations Char-
ter, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Con-
vention of 1948, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Protocols I
and 11.19 It is clear that the Iraqis violated international law when
they gassed thousands of Kurds.
This Comment will also discuss suggestions for more effective
regulation, such as a total-ban treaty with effective verification and
compliance provisions, to ensure that there will be no repetition of
the Kurdish massacres.2 0 The efficacy of forming a permanent inter-
national investigatory body will be analyzed. The importance of en-
forcement of the ban on the export of the technology and chemicals
necessary to make poison gas will also be noted.2 ' An effective ban
on the export of chemical weapon technology will halt the prolifera-
tion of chemical weapons to countries like Iraq which have no com-
punction against using them.
Despite the fact that the gassing of the Kurds was a violation of
humanitarian international law, there have been no diplomatic, eco-
nomic or military reprisals. The international community must now
make a choice: get tough on chemical weapon use or witness the
proliferation and use of poison gas.
• . . accept this prohibition." Id. The Iraqi reservation to the Protocol states that "The Iraqi
Government shall be bound by the provisions of the protocol only with respect to the States
which have both signed and ratified it. . . and shall not be bound by the protocol with respect
to any enemy state whose armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the provisions of the
protocol. United States: Ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol For The Prohibition Of The
Use In War Of Asphyxiating, Poisonous Or Other Gases, And Of Bacteriological Methods Of
Warfare, 14 I.L.M. 49 (1975) [hereinafter U.S. Ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol].
16. N. SIMS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT 5 (1987).
17. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1988, at Al. col. 3.
18. ANN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., LEGAL LIMITs ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 49 (1970).
19. See Murder Within Sovereign Boundaries, N.Y.Times, Sept. 5, 1988, at 20, col. 1.
20. HARRISON & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 16.
21. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, April 4, 1988, at 11.
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II. Iraq's Use Of Chemical Weapons
One writer described the bodily effects of nerve gas, one of the
gasses used against the Kurds, as follows:
First, one detects an odd odor, something like
the scent of garlic. Then the burning sets in,
blurring vision as the eyes begin to smart and
itch. Uncontrollable bouts of sneezing and
coughing follow, often attended by nausea and
vomiting. As the hours crawl by, the inflammation
slowly spreads. When it reaches the respiratory
tract, swelling the internal lining, the breath
shortens and the chest tightens. The skin darkens
to a sickly purplish color, the armpits and other
cavities turning almost black. Excruciating blisters
appear on the neck, chest and thighs, causing
patches of skin to fall off. Large lesions discolor
the genital area. For some, the blisters and the
terror eventually fade, although they may be plagued
by side effects like bone-marrow or gastrointestinal
problems for years to come. Others perish quickly,
the silenced victims of a silent killer.22
The Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein has acted ruthlessly
towards the Kurds, who have been fighting for autonomy for the last
seventy years.23 Because the Kurdish guerrillas were armed and fi-
nanced by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq considers the Kurds
traitors. 4 Since 1987, Iraqi forces have razed villages and deliber-
ately depopulated the region of Kurdistan. 6
. The most horrifying tactic employed by Iraq against the Kurds
has been the use of chemical weapons. 6 Sixty-seven chemical
weapon attacks were reported from April 1987 to April 1988, di-
rected against both Kurdish civilians and the Kurdish guerrillas who
call themselves pesh mergas .2  The most dramatic poison gas attack
22. Smolowe, supra note 7, at 1.
23. The Reuter Library Report, Sept. 4, 1988 (LEas, Nexis library, Intl file). It has
been reported that although the Kurds have survived the fighting of the past seventy years, this
time they have received a beating from which they might never recover. Id.
24. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1988, at A16, col. 1.
25. A. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 14. It has been estimated that, as of 1987, 3,000
villages have been destroyed. Id. Kurdistan means "the land of the Kurds." The region that
was known as Kurdistan after World War One was divided up by the regional powers - Iran,
Iraq, Turkey, Syria and the Soviet Union. Id.
26. Iraq has the largest chemical weapons production capacity in the Third World. It
produces more than 1,000 tons of chemical agents every year, which is sufficient to sustain
prolonged combat operations. Iraq first began developing chemical weapons in 1974 and since
then, chemical weapons have become the backbone of Iraq's strategic weapons capability.
Iraqi Chemical Weapons Stockpiles Tough to Destroy, United Press International, Sept. 10,
1990 (LEas, Nexis library, Intl file).
27. Id. Pesh mergas translates as "those who face death." U.S. NEws & WORLD RE-
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occurred in March 1988, at Halabja.2 1 Iraqi warplanes dropped can-
isters of deadly gas on Halabja and on two nearby villages." Within
minutes, as many as 5,000 were dead and thousands more badly in-
jured.30 Ultimately, thousands of civilians died and many more were
injured in what was presumed to be a reprisal against the people of
an area long notorious as the center of Kurdish resistance.81
On August 20, 1988, a cease-fire took effect in the eight-year
Iran-Iraq war. 2 Since then, Iraq has turned its full fury on the
Kurds.33 Iraqi forces systematically attacked Kurdish villages with
chemical weapons and artillery barrages.3 " The reason for the on-
slaught was vengeance - to punish the Kurds of northern Iraq who
had dared to pursue their long struggle for autonomy during Sad-
dam Hussein's war against Iran.3 5 The Iraqis used mustard gas,
nerve gas and cyanide gas to teach the Kurds a lesson and to create
a Kurd-free buffer zone in battle-scarred northeastern Iraq.3 6
Because of this intense offensive, over 60,000 Kurds fled across
the northern border to Turkey and thousands of others fled to Iran.3 7
Whole families were uprooted because the prime targets of the new
Iraqi onslaught were civilians.38
Iraq vehemently denies that it used chemical weapons against
Kurdish rebels.3 9 The U.S. State Department is certain that Iraq
was using chemical weapons because the United States uncovered
evidence supporting this belief." Sources included the reports of eye-
PORT, Sept. 19, 1988, at 8.
28. US. NEws & WORLD REPORT, April 4, 1988, at 11.
29. Id.
30. MacLeod, The Cries of the Kurds, TiME, Sept. 19, 1988, at 33.
31. A. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 15.
32. The Reuter Library Report, supra note 23.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Safire, Stop the Iraqi Murder of the Kurds, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1988, at A21, col.
1.
36. Haberman, For Turkey's Kurds, Fragile Gains, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1989, at A6,
col. 1. Mustard gas burns, blisters and blackens the skin and can be lethal if inhaled. Nerve
gas is 100 to 1000 times more potent. It causes convulsions and foaming and bleeding at the
mouth before death. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
37. Daily Telegraph (London), Nov. 18, 1988, at 16, col. 3.
38. U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 19, 1988, at 8. At least 2,200 civilians died in
the August offensive compared to 250 Kurdish guerrillas. MacLeod, supra note 30, at 33.
39. The Reuter Library Report, Sept. 22, 1988 (LExis, Nexis library, Intl file). Iraq
insists that it observes international conventions outlawing the use of chemical weapons. Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz has stated that Iraq respects and adheres to all rules and regula-
tions of international law and agreements, including the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The Reuter
Library Report, Sept. 15, 1988 (LEaxis, Nexis library, Intl file).
40. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 6. Proving chemical weapon use is important.
Applying international pressure to nations engaging in chemical warfare is vitally important.
Such pressure cannot be applied unless the world community is convinced that nations accused
of violating chemical weapons treaties are indeed using chemical weapons. Once a breach is
demonstated, international condemnation will mount and stop it. Note, supra note 9, at 269.
At present there are three mechanisms for investigating the facts underlying allegations of
chemical weapons use: adversary investigations, UN General Assembly investigations, and Se-
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witnesses to the attacks, Turks who saw the poisoned victims, reports
from U.S. sources, fragments of shell and bomb casings contami-
nated by the chemicals they contained, and pictures of victims with
skin and lung burns.4 Survivors' accusations have gained broad
credibility in the West.42
There have also been charges of genocide - "not just a whiff
but the stench of genocide drifts from Kurdish areas of Iraq ....
Those who commit such acts should know that the world watches,
that sovereignty cannot legitimize genocide. ' '48 Amnesty Interna-
tional has charged that the mass killings are part of a deliberate
policy to eliminate a large number of Kurds as punishment for their
political sympathies and to retaliate for the activities of Kurdish op-
position forces.4 ' Jalal Talabani, the Kurdish leader of the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), made similar accusations when he ven-
tured out of Iraq in June, 1988 to bring the Kurdish story to the
world.45 Talabani stated that "[i]t's the first time in history a gov-
ernment has used chemical weapons against its own citizens who are
not on the battlefront. Now the Iraqi Government daily is using
chemical weapons. It's an Iraqi war of genocide against the Kurdish
people."'6
Mr. Talabani also condemned the Hussein Government for the
forced migration of thousands of Kurds to non-Kurdish areas and
charged that Iraq destroyed one-thousand Kurdish villages.47 A re-
cent U.S. State Department human rights report described wide-
spread destruction, the bulldozing of Kurdish villages, mass reloca-
tion of Kurds, and exile of Kurdish families into non-Kurdish parts
of Iraq.' 8 Many conclude that the Kurds are suffering from various
forms of state oppression, including cultural oppression, economic
oppression, political oppression, and physical oppression to the point
curity Council meetings. Id. A number of nations have called for an investigation of the
charges against Iraq by the U.N., but none has been forthcoming. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1988,
at Al, col.3. For a discussion of the three mentioned mechanisms see Note, supra note 9, at
269-75.
41. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
42. Haberman, supra note 36, at A6, col. 1.
43. Murder Within Sovereign Borders, supra note 19, at A20, col. 1. In a world that
jealously guards the sovereignty of states, no international police can be summoned if a coun-
try slaughters within its own borders. There are no easy solutions to this problem of ethnic
conflicts rooted in centuries of antagonism, and the Kurds are a particularly apt example. Id.
44. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1988, at A16, col. 1.
45. Sciolino, supra note 10, at A3, col. 1. The PUK is one of the two main Kurdish
separatist groups in Iraq. Id. The other group is the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), which
is led by Masoud Barzani. MacLeod, supra note 30, at 33. Masoud Barzani is the son of the
legendary leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, (1898-1979), who never achieved the goal of inde-
pendence. However, his stubborn attempts to obtain it and his ability to inspire the Kurds to
continue fighting made him a nationist hero. A. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 6.
46. Sciolino, supra note 10, at A3, col. 2.
47. Id.
48.. Id.
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of genocide."9
Despite the desperate plight of the Kurds, world reaction has
been muted.50 The United States Senate passed a bill calling for eco-
nomic sanctions, but the Reagan Administration vehemently opposed
congressional action aimed at imposing economic sanctions on Iraq. 1
No major action was taken by the Reagan Administration for fear
that it would help Iran's Islamic extremists defeat Iraq and domi-
nate the oil-rich Persian Gulf. The Senate also accused Iraq of geno-
cide and condemned its use of chemical weapons .5 The Reagan Ad-
ministration stopped short of labeling Iraq's actions genocide
because they did not want to antagonize that strong Middle Eastern
country.5 3 Finally, two years after the gassing of Halajaba, the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee voted to impose trade sanctions
against Iraq in protest of its use of chemical weapons and its general
disregard for human rights.54
America's allies proceeded even more cautiously. Great Britain
was concerned with its appearance in the press.55 The Thatcher Gov-
ernment believed that criticism of Iraq might appear to be an at-
tempt to appease Iran in the hope of gaining the release of British
hostages held by pro-Iranian groups.56 France was concerned with
money owed to it by Iraq.57 Although French officials condemned
the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, they remained mindful of the fact
that Baghdad still owed Paris several billion dollars for weapons de-
livered during the Iran-Iraq war. 8 France, West Germany, Britain,
and Italy were also competing for lucrative contracts to rebuild
Iraq.59 Vehement criticism might have jeopardized their bids.
Arab countries have rallied behind Iraq because they are wary
of Iran's fundamentalist regime, and because they do not want to
49. A. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 22.
50. Smolowe, supra note 1, at 36. Nations that are not directly involved in the use of
chemical weapons tend to ignore the allegations of usage because it is easier to do so. Also,
human nature tends to disbelieve that nations are using weapons as horrible as chemical weap-
ons. However, world opinion is all that is available to stop the use of such weapons. Note,
supra note 9, at 285.
51. Allies are Urging US Restraint on Libya, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1989, at A8, col. 2.
52. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 19, 1988, at 8.
53. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
54. Senate Panel Approves Iraq Trade Sanctions, United Press International, June 28,
1990 (LExis, Nexis library, Intl file). The bill calls for cutting off credit guarantees that Iraq
uses to buy U.S. farm products. Iraq is the largest importer of American rice. It also
purchases cattle, eggs, corn, sugar, chicken, lumber, and tobacco from the U.S. The sanctions
would remain in effect until the President certifies that Iraq is complying with international
human rights conventions and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Id.
55. Smolowe, supra note 1, at 36.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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undermine the fragile cease-fire.60 The Arab states also do not want
to antagonize the country with the strongest army in the Middle
East.61 They fear a dangerous precedent would be set by allowing a
U.N. investigation team to inspect a purely domestic problem.62
Finally, in September 1988, ten nations invoked Security Coun-
cil Resolution 620, calling for an inquiry into Iraqi conduct.6s The
resolution condemned Iraq for illegally using poison gas and re-
quested that the Secretary General investigate the allegations."' Iraq
rejected U.N. inspection as a challenge to its sovereignty. 6 Protest
over Iraq's actions has not been sufficient enough to move the U.N.
to vote for a human rights investigation.66 One reason for the inac-
tion is Third World solidarity; the developing countries do not want
to criticize one of their own.67 Another reason for the silence is the
U.N.'s concern for the interests of its members, instead of for the
lives of the Kurdish people or the proliferation of the use of poison
gas.68
Recently, the world had a chance to voice its objections to the
Iraqi use of chemical weapons. In late 1988, President Reagan called
for a world-wide conference to reaffirm commitments to the 1925
Geneva accord.69 The conference was held in Paris, in January
1989.70 One hundred forty-nine nations adopted the Final Declara-
tion which reaffirmed the principle of no first-use of poison gas."
The delegates failed, however, to censure Iraq for its routine use of
chemical weapons, although this was one of the events precipitating
the conference.72 The fact remains that Iraq has used chemical
weapons for the past eight years with no serious objection, economic
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1988, at Al. col. 3.
64. Id. at AI, col. 4,
65. Smolowe, supra note 1, at 36. Three additional countries lent support to the effort
after the Reagan Administration leaked word that the U.S. had intercepted Iraqi communica-
tions confirming that lethal gas had been used. Id. Iraq invited journalists to investigate the
Kurdish charges instead. Many considered this move to be a clever evasion - experts are
trained to detect signs that a journalist might miss. Id.
66. Tears for the Kurds, N.Y. Times, April 10, 1989, at A16, col. 1.
67. Safire, supra note 35, at A21, col. 1.
68. Id.
69. Cody, 149 Nations Vow to Shun Poison Gas, Washington Post, Jan. 12, 1989, at
Al, col. 5.
70. Id.
71. Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested
States On the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: Final Declaration, 28 I.L.M. 1020 (1989).
Paragraph one expressed the intent to pursue disarmament, to eliminate chemical weapons and
to support humanitarian assistance of victims of chemical weapons. Paragraph two called all
states to accede to the Protocol. The third paragraph stressed the necessity of a convention
banning chemical weapons. Paragraph four urged all states to use restraint in the interim.
Finally, the fifth paragraph affirmed the role of the U.N. Id. at 1021. Iraq was a party to this
declaration. Id. at 1020.
72. Cody, supra note 69, at Al, col. 5.
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sanction, or threat of sanction from a non-involved nation.
Some progress has been made, however, on a new chemical
weapons treaty. The negotiators at the Geneva Conference ended
their latest round of talks in April, 1990 without an accord.7 8 The
major stumbling block was the necessity of concluding a bilateral
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. " This
obstacle was overcome on June 1, 1990, at the Washington Summit
where Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed a bilateral agreement
on chemical arms control and disarmament.7 5 Peruvian Ambassador
Oswaldo de Rivero, who will chair the next Geneva session, stated
that this momentous agreement "will certainly give fresh impetus to
the Geneva Conference."7'6 These events suggest that the Kurdish
tragedy may have raised consciousness about the horrors of chemcial
weapons and may lead to action by the superpowers. As the super-
powers lay down their chemical swords together, they are challeng-
ing all countries to do the same.
Over two years have now passed since the horrific Iraqi on-
slaught. The plight of the all-but-forgotten Kurds has remained un-
changed.77 As of November 1989, about 35,000 Iraqi Kurds still
lived in tent cities and barracks-like apartment complexes in south-
eastern Turkey.78 They are forced to remain in a country that denies
them basic human rights.79 The Turks encouraged 14,000 Kurds to
73. Chemical Arms Pact Hits Snag in Geneva, Defense News, April 30, 1990 (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Intl file).
74. Id.
75. Laying Down the Chemical-Arms Sword, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 20, 1990, at
18, col. 4. The main points of the agreement are as follows:
* Destruction of at least fifty percent of stocks by 1999.
* Stocks to be reduced to 5,000 agent tons by 2002.
* Stopping the production of chemical weapons when this agreement enters
into force, without waiting for the global chemical weapons ban.
* On-site inspection during and after the destruction process to verify that
demilition has taken place.
* Annual exchanges of data on declared stockpile levels to aid monitoring of
the stockpiles.
* Cooperation in developing and using environmentally safe methods of
destruction.
* Encouragement to chemical-weapons-capable nations to become parties to
the multilateral convention.
Summit in Washington: Summary of U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times,
June 2, 1990, at 8, col. 2.
76. Regin, U.S.-Soviet Accord Gives Impetus to Chemical Weapons Talks, Reuter Li-
brary Report, June 12, 1990 (LExIs, Nexis library, Intl file). Reaching a comprehensive ban
on chemical weapons is a daunting task. There are many reasons for the slow pace of negotia-
tions. A global ban is extremely complicated. It would affect a crucial world industry whose
component parts have other legitimate uses. The intrusive inspection procedures that would be
required raise concerns among chemical producers. Finally, nations such as Iraq and Libya
would have no qualms about violating the ban. Flowerree, Banish the Shadow of Chemical
Warfare, Newsday, April 20, 1990, at 85, col. 1.
77. Tears for the Kurds, supra note 66, at A16, col. 1.
78. Haberman, supra note 36, at A6, col. 1.
79. Id. It is in Turkey, the country with the largest Kurdish population, that many
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 9:1
move to Iran, another country that slaughters its Kurds.80 The living
conditions in these camps are dismal; the quarters are cramped, the
occupants have nothing to do, the after-effects of poison gas and
poor nutrition combine to cause illness and death."1 The Kurds are
treated like prisoners because the Turks believe the Iraqi Kurds may
present a security problem.82 The Iraqi Kurds remain the stateless
people. about whom the world has forgotten. The United States and
other western governments did nothing to stop Saddam Hussein until
he threatened their vital interests in the region."'
III. Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons as a Violation of International
Law
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice provides that the court shall apply international conventions, in-
ternational custom, general principles of law, judicial decisions, and
the teachings of highly qualified publicists when resolving disputes .8
These five categories are traditionally classified as the sources and
evidences of international law.88 In determining whether the Iraqi
use of poison gas against the Kurds violated international law, the
three most important sources must be examined to determine
whether they prohibit the use of chemical weapons in the Kurdish
situation. The Kurdish tragedy will serve to illustrate the strengths
and weaknesses of the current regulatory regime.
Kurds feel they have been most suppressed over the years. For more than six decades, Turkey
has not accepted the Kurds as a legitimate minority. Kurds are officially known as "mountain
Turks." Id.
While Iraqi Kurds wear traditional Kurdish dress, Turkish Kurds wear Western dress.
Iraqi Kurds maintain the emblems of an identity. Conversely, Turkey's Kurds have homes and
land, but their identity is under constant challenge. Turkey's Kurds have been involved in an
insurgency since 1984. N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1988, at Al, col. 4.
80. Haberman, supra note 36, at A6, col. 1. The Ayatollah Khomeini executed as many
15,000 Kurds and sent 200,000 troops to occupy the province of Kurdistan. Tears for the
Kurds, supra note 66, at A16, col. 1.
81. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1989, at A4, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1988, at A21, col.
1.
82. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1988, at A21, col. 1. Turkey is battling its own Kurdish guer-
rillas, who fight for autonomy under the banner of the Kurdish Workers Party. Since 1984,
1,100 have been killed in skirmishes with the Turkish army. Id.
83. Aram, Belated Reaction to Kurds' Plight, Independent (London), Sept. 10, 1990, at
18, col. 3.
84. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, reprinted in S. ROSENNE, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 815 (1965). The International Court of
Justice is the ultimate judicial authority in matters of international law. The court exists in
conjunction with the United Nations as the successor to the League of Nations' Permanent
Court of International Justice. Under Article 93(1) of the United Nations Charter, all mem-
bers are parties to the court's governing principles (Statute) and enjoy full access to the court.
Id. at 271.
85. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, 289 (3d ed. 1986).
These sources are listed in order of importance. Id.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS
A. International Conventions
There are only two treaties now in force that specifically pro-
hibit certain aspects of chemical warfare; the Hague Declaration IV
of 1899 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Because the Geneva Pro-
tocol of 1925 (with 115 signatories) is the most influential, it will be
analyzed first.
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 provides in relevant part:
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other
gases, and of all analogous liquids materials or devices, has been
justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilised world;
and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in
Treaties to which the majority of Powers are Parties; and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally ac-
cepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the con-
science and the practice of nations;
DECLARE:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not
already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use, accept this pro-
hibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of bacterio-
logical methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between
themselves according to the terms of this declaration . . ..
The Geneva Protocol must be analyzed to determine if the Iraqi
use of chemical weapons against the Kurds violated International
Law.87 When Iraq utilized chemical weapons in 1988, many newspa-
per and magazine articles stated that the Iraqis had violated the Ge-
neva Protocol of 1925.88 At first glance, such statements appear cor-
rect. Such is not the case. 9 A careful reading of the Geneva
Protocol reveals that there are problems regarding its applicability to
the Kurdish situation.
86. Geneva Protocol of 1925, supra note 14.
87. See THOMAS & THOMAs, supra note 18, at 73. Even if it were determined that the
Iraqis did violate the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Protocol does not specify sanctions. It
merely states that the parties to the agreement will use their best efforts to make other nations
comply. Geneva Protocol of 1925, supra note 13. Lack of sanctions is not an unusual feature in
international conventions because viable options for international sanctions are limited. Note,
supra note 9, at 266.
88.- Smolowe, The Search for a Poison Antidote, TIME, Jan. 16, 1989, at 22; N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 1988, at Al, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
89. Resolving treaty interpretation disputes is critical; when international obligations are
unclear or ambiguous, a nation can contend that it did not violate the treaty by its use of
chemical warfare. Note, supra note 9, at 292. If treaty terms were clarified, countries could be
certain when a breach occurred. This could result in increased political pressure on the breach-
ing country. Id.
Disputes over interpretation could be settled more easily if the parties amended the chem-
ical weapons agreements to require compulsory submission of such disputes to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Id. at 293. Adopting such an amendment would show that nations are
serious about enforcement. Id. at 294.
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Treaty interpretation is analogous to statutory interpretation
and often includes an analysis of specific terms to determine if par-
ties breached the treaty.90 The Geneva Protocol contains three re-
quirements: (1) it applies only to parties to the Protocol, (2) in situa-
tions that constitute a war, and (3) that involve the use of prohibited
agents. Interpretive problems exist regarding each requirement. One
problem is that the preamble of the Protocol makes reference only to
the "use in war" of chemical weapons; the operative portion of the
Protocol thus refers only to warfare.9 1 War is used in its material
sense, rather than in its formal sense (i.e. declared war).92 Interna-
tional war occurs when a government no longer permits its relations
with another government to be guided by the laws of peace." "War"
is international war - war between states.94 The understanding
throughout the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 that deal with the
conduct of warfare is that these conventions apply to war between
states, and unless expressly provided, not to civil war or insurgency."
Because the Geneva Protocol does not apply, by its own terms,
to civil wars or domestic disturbances, it does not apply to the Iraqis'
use of poison gas against the Kurds. The Kurds are a distinct ethnic
group, but they do not constitute a state. They are Iraqi citizens who
are fighting for political autonomy; therefore, the Geneva Protocol
cannot be applied to this situation.
There is a second problem with the applicability of the Geneva
Protocol. Iraq's reservation to the Protocol provides as follows:
90. Note, International Regulation of Chemical and Biological Weapons: "Yellow
Rain" and Arms Control, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1029. The multilateral Vienna Convention of
the Law of Treaties supplements the International Court of Justice Statute by delineating
guidelines for treaty interpretation.
One of the most important provisions is Article 18 which dictates that a "[s/tate is
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when. . . it
has signed the treaty . . . until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to
the treaty." Also important is Article 38 which states that a treaty may become binding upon
a nonparty as a customary rule of international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 38; reprinted in T. EIAS,
THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES (1974); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 129/15 (1986) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Although Iraq is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the Convention may still be bind-
ing. The Convention purportedly reflects customary international law and; therefore, binds
Iraq. Note, supra note 90, at 1038.
91. Geneva Protocol of 1925, supra note 14.
92. Baxter & Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 853, 868 (1970).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 869. The consensus appears to be that purely civil wars are not covered by the
phrase "use in war." Note, supra note 9, at 291. Some suggest that the Protocol itself is not
applicable to armed conflicts not having an international character, but it is not clear what
constitutes a conflict with an international character. Gasser, Internationalized Non-Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon 33 AM. U. L.
REV. 145 (1983). The Iraqi situation might be considered an armed conflict of international
character because the Kurds did receive assistance from the Iranians. However, it is not clear
whether that is enough or if participation of military units is necessary. Id.
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The Iraqi Government shall be bound by the provisions of
the protocol only with respect to the States which have both
signed and ratified it or which have acceded to it, and shall not
be bound by the protocol with respect to any enemy State whose
armed forces or whose allies fail to respect the provisions of the
protocol. 9"
This reservation requires mutuality of obligation. Iraq is bound to
refrain from the use of chemical weapons against only those states
that have ratified the Protocol. This means that a state party to the
Protocol may employ chemical weapons against any non-party
state.97 The Iraqi use of chemical weapons against the Kurds does
not violate the Geneva Protocol because of this reservation. The
Kurds are not a political entity, and thus have not become a party to
the Protocol.
Other criticisms of the Protocol exist. The Geneva Protocol only
prohibits the use of chemical weapons. It does not prohibit their pro-
duction or stockpiling. This is because the Protocol governs the hu-
manitarian conduct of war; it is not an arms control agreement. An-
other deficiency of the Protocol is its lack of provisions for verifying
compliance, investigating noncompliance, or enforcing the prohibi-
tions. Finally, the Protocol does not define terms such as "war,"
"asphixiating," or "other gases." These deficiencies are, unfortu-
nately, painfully obvious in the Kurdish situation.
A second treaty that prohibits certain aspects of chemical war-
fare is the Hague Declaration IV of 1899. The sixteen signatories
adopted a declaration which stated that the parties should not, in
war between two or more signatories, use projectiles the sole object
of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. 9" Iraq
is not a signatory of the Hague Declaration. Furthermore, the Decla-
ration was not signed by a sufficient number of states to give it appli-
cability as a matter of international law. 9 9
Because there are only two conventions dealing specifically with
chemical weapons and because these are not applicable to the Kurd-
ish situation, we must now examine prohibitions in other conventions
on the use of weapons in general. Despite an element of paradox, the
law has produced certain customs of warfare: military necessity, hu-
manity and chivalry.10 0 This customary law of war on land was codi-
fied in the Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of
War on Land of 1907 (Hague IV). 10 1 Article 23(a) appears espe-
96. U.S. Ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note 15, at 49.
97. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 92, at 870.
98. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (H. Lauterpacht, 7th ed. 1952).
99. 0. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 557 (3d ed. 1948).
100. I. BROWNLIE, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 141 (S. Rose ed. 1986).
101. Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907
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cially relevant because it forbids the employment of poison or
poisoned weapons; practice has revealed a restrictive interpretation
of that term.102 States have not applied Article 23's prohibition to
the use of poison gas because Hague IV was formulated at a time
when the experience of mankind did not encompass poison in terms
of chemical weapons.103
Article 23(e) of Hague IV, pertaining to unnecessary suffering,
codifies the principle of humanity. One of the most frequent objec-
tions raised against chemical warfare is that it is inhumane.10' The
paramount question is not whether poison gas causes suffering, but
whether it causes "unnecessary suffering." The use of poison gas in
some situations is as acceptable as the use of conventional weap-
ons,10 5 but the Iraqi's use of mustard gas and the especially noxious
nerve gas against the Kurds caused the Kurds "unnecessary"
suffering. 106
Because the Kurds had no protective clothing, the gases came
into direct contact with their skin and lungs. Exposure to mustard
gas results in "systematic poisoning with malaise, nausea, vomiting,
fever, cardiac irregularities, and death within twenty-four hours to
two weeks.110 7 The symptoms of exposure to nerve gases, in order of
appearance, are: "running nose; tightness of chest; dimness of vision
and pinpointing of the eye pupils; difficulty in breathing; drooling
and excessive sweating; nausea; vomiting, cramps, and involuntary
defecation and urination; twitching; jerking and staggering; head-
ache; confusion; drowsiness; coma and convulsion . . . followed by
cessation of breathing and death."108 The survivors of the Halabja
gassing watched their skin blister and fall away, or gasped helplessly
(Hague IV) 36 Stat 2277, T.S. No. 539. Hague IV provides in part that it is forbidden:
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons:
(b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile na-
tion or army;...
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering.
Id.
102. Kelly, Gas Warfare in Internationai Law, 9 MIL. L. Rav. 44 (1960).
103. Id.
104. After the First World War, some writers argued that chemical weapons were more
humane because they produced a lower ratio of fatalities to casualties and of permanently
disabled people to total casualties. R. CLARKE, THE SILENT WEAPONS 204 (1968). Whatever
validity that assertion once had, it is no longer true today because more lethal nerve gas has
been developed that results in a very high ratio of fatalities to casualties. Id. at 205.
The widespread revulsion to the use of chemical weapons seems to be intuitive; few have
articulated the reasons for viewing chemical weapons differently than other weapons. Some
suggested reasons for treating chemical weapons differently are: they often cause protracted
suffering, they are uniquely anti-civilian, they may open up a whole new sphere of weapons
research, and they may alter the balance of nature. Note, supra note 9, at 261.
105. Kelly, supra note 102, at 48; see also THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 18, at 66.
106. See Smolowe, supra note 7, at 46.
107. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 18, at 7.
108. Id. at 5.
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from internal injuries. 109 Considering the preceding description of
the death caused by poison gas, "unnecessary" suffering most cer-
tainly occurred when the Iraqis brutally punished the Kurdish mi-
nority for its twenty year guerilla war.
The last provision in Hague IV of some relevance to the topic of
chemical weapons is article 23(b) dealing with treachery in warfare.
The prohibition against treachery can be equated with the principle
of chivalry in warfare. 110 Poison gas generally cannot be considered a
treacherous weapon." Treachery refers instead to deceit and viola-
tions of confidence rather than surprise."' The meaning of treachery
depends on its use in a particular situation; in the Kurdish situation,
it does not appear, from the indirect evidence, that the Iraqis were
deceitful.
The Iraqis apparently violated Hague IV since they caused "un-
necessary" suffering. However, Hague IV applies only to war, as its
title, Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(emphasis added), suggests. The convention is not applicable to in-
ternal conflicts. But for this fact, the Iraqis would have violated the
Convention. As previously mentioned, the customary rules of law are
not displaced by their codification and the prohibitions of treaties are
not necessarily coextensive with corresponding prohibitions in cus-
tomary international law.113 Since it is generally accepted that gen-
eral principles of the humanitarian law of war apply to internal con-
flicts, the unnecessary suffering principle of customary law should
apply to the Kurdish tragedy."1'
The Hague Conventions on the law of war deal with rules for
the conduct of hostilities. Another, seperate aspect of the law of war
has been developed: the humanitarian law applicable to armed con-
flict. 1 5 These principles have been codified in the Geneva laws."
The conventions comprising the Geneva laws are directed toward
rules of a distinctly humanitarian nature, those concerning the pro-
tection of the human being or of the essential aspects of humanity. It
was recognized that non-international wars have been frequent and
deadly, so article 3, which is identical in all four of the Geneva Con-
ventions, contains basic rules applicable to these conflicts. Article 3
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
109. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, April 4, 1988, at 11.
110. I. BROWNLtE, supra note 100, at 141.
111. Kelly, supra note 102, at 48.
112. Id.
113. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 92, at 856.
114. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 100, at 142.
115. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 6 (21st International
Conference of the Red Cross, 1969) [hereinafter ICRC REAFF.RMATION].
116. Id.
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In the case of armed conflict not of an international charac-
ter occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all cir-
cumstances be treated humanely, without any distinc-
tion founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth
or wealth, or any other similar criteria . . .117
The Kurdish insurgency is clearly "an armed conflict not of an
international character." In applying article 3 to the Iraqis use of
chemical weapons against the Kurds, three aspects of the conflict fall
within the meaning of the provision. First, most of the casualties
were civilians who were taking no active part in the hostilities. While
some critics restrict the application of article 3 to those who are al-
ready victims of an armed conflict, such as prisoners and the sick or
wounded, 118 literal interpretation of the clause seems to suggest that
applicability includes, but is not limited to, the sick and the
wounded.
Second, gassing civilians, killing and seriously wounding
thousands, and causing over 60,000 to flee the country can hardly be
characterized as humane treatment. Finally, the Kurds were af-
forded such inhumane treatment because they are a distinctive eth-
nic group that has never been assimilated into mainstream Arab so-
ciety. The logical conclusion is that the Iraqis violated the Geneva
Conventions.
In the late 1960's, the international community believed that
humanitarian laws and customs needed to be developed and reaf-
firmed, especially in the area of internal conflicts.1 19 The ensuing ef-
fort resulted in two protocols. These two protocols updated the Ge-
neva Conventions and Hague IV, and introduced new rules into the
law of war. The one most applicable to the Kurdish situation is The
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
117. Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Treatment of Prisoners of War 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,
75 U.N.T.S. 135; Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S.
No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions].
118. Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and its Relation to Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 14
(1983).
119. ICRC REAFFIRMATION, supra note 115, at 8.
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Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) adopted by the Conference on 6 June
1977.110 These protocols represent a tremendous advance in humani-
tarian law, particularly in their concern for the protection of civil-
ians.121 Although Iraq is not a party to Protocol II, the convention is
evidence of the existing state of international law and so the princi-
ples enshrined in Protocol II may be binding upon Iraq. 2
Article 1 of Protocol II deals with its material field of applica-
tion and provides, in relevant part:
This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without
modifying its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all
armed conflicts . . . which take place in the territory of a High
Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed
forces . . . which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations . . . ,s
The Kurds have been fighting for centuries for independence.124 Sad-.
dam Hussein has been the target of this rebellion since 1974.115 At
one point, the Kurds controlled much of Iraqi Kurdistan with the
support they received from the Shah of Iran. 2'
The requirements for the applicability of Protocol are satisfied.
The Protocol, therefore, applies to the gassing of the Kurds because
the Kurds had been fighting against the Iraqi government. Article 4
provides for the humane treatment of "all persons who do not take a
direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities . . .," which
includes respect for their person, honor and convictions. 27 Violence
to life, health and physical or mental well-being, such as murder, is
120. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocols I & II].
121. See ICRC REAFFIRMATION, supra note 115, at 9.
122. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 100, at 142. An example of Protocols I & II that provides
evidence of the existing state of international law is found in the comments made in a study of
the armed conflict in Bolivia. Both sides were called upon to abide by the provisions of interna-
tional humanitarian law, inter alia, the Geneva Conventions and Protocols I & II, even though
Bolivia was not a party at that time - "It is nevertheless essential to bear in mind that such
obligations exist as a direct consequence of the Charter of the U.N. and The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights." Ramcharan, The Role of International Bodies in the Implementa-
tion and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in Non-International Armed
Conflicts, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 99 (1983).
123. Protocol II, supra note 122, at 1443. The original intent of the ICRC was to give
broad scope to the Protocol. It desired a low threshold of violence to trigger the Protocol.
Disappointment was apparent when the "necessity to control territory" requirement was
added. Forsythe, Legal Management of Internal War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-Interna-
tional Armed Conflict, 72 AM. J. Iwr'L. L. 284 (1978).'
124. Barnes, supra note 13, at 55.
125. A. HYMAN, supra note 13, at 7.
126. Id.
127. Protocol II, supra note 122, at 1444.
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prohibited.1 28 The Iraqi gassing of the Kurds violated article 4 of
Protocol II because of the great violence to civilian life that resulted
from the attacks. Thousands of civilians were killed, and many more
were badly injured.2 9 Arguably, almost any use of chemical weap-
ons against civilians would violate Protocol II. The Kurdish tragedy
was unquestionably a violation of the humanitarian laws of war as
codified in Protocol II.
A third type of international law relevant to the Kurdish situa-
tion are conventions codifying general international human rights
laws. The United Nations Charter was the first international docu-
ment that endowed individual human beings with fundamental
human rights and freedoms.130 The Charter is a legal document; its
language is that of international law. 18' There is no doubt that the
provisions of the Charter impose upon member states the legal duty
to obey them; a member guilty of a violation of these provisions
breaches the Charter itself.182
The U.N. Charter heralded a new international law of human
rights. Gone was the dogmatic belief that a government's behavior
toward its own nationals was a matter of domestic, not international,
concern.'3 s Beginning with the preamble, the Charter reaffirms
"faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
"9184human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women...
Article 1 of the Charter provides that one of the purposes of the
United Nations is to promote and encourage "respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion . . ."'5 A mandatory obligation is
implied in article 55(c) of the Charter to promote "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction . . ."s' Finally, article 56 of the Charter, in
which members pledge to take action to achieve the purposes of arti-
cle 55, imposes a distinct legal duty to respect and follow all of the
128. Id.
129. Smolowe, supra note 7, at 46.
130. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (1968).
131. Id. at 34. The Charter repeatedly affirms the fundamental human rights of the
individual, which must be deemed to refer to legal rights - to legal rights recognized by inter-
national law and independent of the law of the State. Id.
132. Id. There may be no international tribunal that has compulsory jurisdiction to dis-
cover the facts of a violation of the Charter, but international tribunals have no compulsory
jurisdiction in the matter of the fulfillment of international duties. Id. If the Charter forms
part of the municipal law of the member state, it is enforceable as such. Id. at 35.
. 133. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 6 (L.Henkin ed. 1981)[hereinafter INTER-
NATIONAL BILL]. The Charter penetrated national frontiers and the veil of sovereignty. Its true
purpose was to improve the lot of individual men and women. Id.
134. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
135. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
136. H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 132, at 148.
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mandates of the Charter.3 7
The pledge of action in article 56, and all other articles previ-
ously described, are violated when a member state persists in com-
mitting gross violations of human rights universally recognized as
fundamental. There are no rights more fundamental than the rights
to life, to physical integrity, and to liberty.1"' These rights were vio-
lated when the Iraqis dropped chemical weapons on the unprotected
and unsuspecting Kurds.'39 Any use of chemical weapons against ci-
vilians would violate the U.N. Charter.
The last human rights convention to be analyzed is the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Genocide Convention). Article II of the Genocide Convention pro-
vides as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the fol-
lowing acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to mem-
bers of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its' physical destruction
in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group. 10
Other claims of genocide by Iraq had been made to the U.N.
prior to the 1988 gassing catastrophe, but no formal decision has
been reached due to political pressures and lack of opportunity for
enforcement."" The crimes the Iraqis committed this time were
much worse. They killed thousands of Kurds with the intent to de-
stroy the minority group that had been plaguing them for the past
seventy years." 2 From the foregoing analyses, it is clear that the
137. Id.
138. INTERNATIONAL BILL, supra note 135, at 114.
139. Human rights organizations declared that the mass killings from the army assault
and from chemical weapons use "represent a most serious denial of the purposes of the United
Nations Charter and a flagrant contravention of fundamental international human rights
norms." The Reuters Library Report, Sept. 8, 1988 (LExis, Nexis library, Intl file).
140. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 Dec.
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. The U.S. had not ratified
the Genocide Convention as of 1988. Id.
141. J. PORTER. GENOCIDE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1982).
142. The European Parliament passed a motion accusing Iraq of trying to wipe out the
Kurds with chemical weapons. The Reuters Library Report, supra note 23. In addition, the
Iraqi acts were characterized as a "campaign of extermination" aimed at an ancient ethnic
group that strives to keep its own language and customs. Safire, supra note 35, at A21, col. 1.
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Iraqis have violated international human rights laws.
B. Customary Law
Custom has been referred to as "the oldest and the original
source of international law."' 143 International custom as a law creat-
ing procedure must meet two conditions: 1) practice among states;
and 2) the conviction that the practice is applied because it is legally
binding.14 4
The most important customary laws of war, as discussed above,
address unnecessary suffering, noncombatants, and chemical weap-
ons. It is an incontestable principle of customary law that the use of
weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering is forbidden.'45
The Iraqis' use of chemical weapons against the Kurds caused un-
necessary suffering because the death associated with poison gas is
violent and causes serious injury. That the conflict between the
Iraqis and the Kurds is not "war" or an international conflict is in-
consequential; the modern interpretation of international law applies
the law of land warfare to insurgencies.146
Another international custom distinguishes between the use of
weapons against, combatants and noncombatants during an armed
conflict.147 The indiscriminate nature of poison gas makes its use
likely to violate this custom. The Iraqis made no attempt to differen-
tiate between civilians and combatants; on the contrary, civilians
were their primary target. 48
A split of authority exists with respect to whether there is a
customary rule of law prohibiting the use of chemical weapons.' 49
The disagreement continues today. As recently as ten years ago, the
use of chemical weapons was taboo, but that taboo has now been
143. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 98, at 25-26. Custom is defined as the conduct, or the
conscious abstention from certain conduct, of members of a society that becomes a part of the
legal order of that society. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 85, at 209.
144. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 18, at 135.
145. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 100, at 147.
146. Id.
147. Kelly, supra note 102, at 48.
148. See U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 19, 1988, at 8.
149. The writers Kelly and Thomas make strong arguments as to why such a custom did
not exist at the time they were writing. The reservations made to the Geneva Protocol of 1925
indicate that no custom was recognized at that time. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 18, at
78. No poison gas was used in combat during the Second World War because of the Geneva
Protocol. "It would be difficult to argue that the practice of states resulting from a convention
they signed has independently created a custom that binds other states who have deliberately
refrained from adhering to the convention. Kelly, supra note 102, at 50.
Oppenheim and Brownlie believe that the peace treaties of the First World War, the
Washington Treaty of 1922 and the Geneva Protocol of 1925, are evidence that chemical
warfare is prohibited by customary international law. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 100, at 143.
For a survey of commentators, see Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and Germ Warfare: Should the
United States Agree?, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 375, 386 n.57.
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weakened, if not destroyed.150 Evidence of this is shown by the num-
ber of countries that have used chemical weapons in the past two
decades which include Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan (the Soviets and the
Afghan military), Vietnam, Cuba, Libya and The Sudan. 151 The
moral prohibition that has held the horrors of chemical weapons in
check for the past seventy years has crumbled, in part because the
world has been silent. Iraq's flagrant violation of human rights and
the customary laws of war did not inspire an outcry from other coun-
tries. This silence gave other governments the impression that they
could also use chemical weapons without risking international cen-
sure. World opinion will not weigh too heavily in a country's decision
to use chemical weapons. Telling evidence of the crumbling prohibi-
tion is provided by Iraq's threats to use chemical weapons in the
current Persian Gulf crisis.
At least twenty countries now have chemical weapons or have
the present capability to make them.'52 Proliferation has been great-
est in the Third World because chemical weapons are cheap and
simple to produce. 15  They are known as the poor man's atom
bomb.'14 Terrorists and drug runners may take advantage of the ab-
sence of world outrage and of the proliferation of chemical weapons,
and may utilize chemical weapons. The Director of U.S. Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency has stated that "there is a general
consensus that use of chemical weapons is wrong. I think we want to
re-establish that."' 55 From the foregoing evidence, it appears that
whatever custom there might have been banning chemical weapons
no longer exists in certain circles. Practice of states has demon-
strated that chemical weapons may be used without retaliation.
C. General Principles of Law
A third source of international law is derived from those princi-
ples of law that are generally recognized by civilized countries. 56
One of the general principles of international law applicable to
chemical weapons is proportionality - the ends to be gained must
150. Smolowe, supra note 7, at 47.
151. HARRISON & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 87-89. Many of the countries mentioned
have used chemical weapons numerous times against a number of different victims. For a
description of these allegations see id.
152. Smolowe, supra note 7, at 47.
153. Id.
154. The Reuter Library Report, Sept. 25, 1989 (LExIs, Nexis library, Intl file).
155. Smolowe, The Search for a Poison Antidote, TIME, Jan. 16, 1989, at 22.
156. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 18, at 187. "General principles of law" refers to
the principles of "general significance in the legal systems of all or most civilized or developed
countries." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 85, at 321. International law shares a sub-
structure of basic propositions based on equitable or natural law principles with a country's
municipal law. Kelly, supra note 102, at 51.
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be proportional to the means used to attain them.'
The Iraqis' goals were to punish the Kurds for their rebellion
and to end the rebellion. Killing thousands of civilians and seriously
wounding many more was excessive in proportion to the end of put-
ting down the rebellion. The unnecessary suffering and death of in-
nocents can hardly be justified by the Iraqis with the excuse that
they were suppressing a rebellion. The Iraqis violated the general
principle of proportionality. This principle could be applicable to
other instances of chemical warfare depending upon the factual
situation.
Another important principle is the de Martens clause. " This
clause stands for the "dictates of the public conscience," and appears
in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. " The public conscience is
difficult to determine and, under modern methods of propaganda, it
is possible for public conscience to be channeled into the changing
currents of public opinion.'60 It is, therefore, unreliable to legally
bind states to a pattern of conduct for the future. 6' Whether the
Iraqis have violated the de Martens clause is questionable because of
the difficulty in determining what constitutes the "public
conscience."
Other important principles of international human rights law
are contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Decla-
ration). 162 The Declaration was adopted by the U.N. General As-
sembly in 1948 and has been accepted by almost all countries.'
63
Quite a number of provisions in the Declaration apply to the Kurd-
ish situation, but only the most important will be analyzed. The pre-
amble of the Declaration mentions the promotion of universal re-
spect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Article 2 of the Declaration is a non-discrimination clause,
which is applicable because the Kurds were singled out due to their
race. Especially important is article 3 of the Declaration, which pro-
vides that "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of
person."' 64 The right to life was violated when the Iraqis murdered
thousands of innocent people. Finally, article 13 of the Declaration
gives everyone the "right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state."' 65 The Iraqi gas onslaught caused
157. Kelly, supra note 102, at 51.
158. Id. at 61.
159. Id.
160. THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 18, at 191.
161. Kelly, supra note 102, at 62.
162. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Declaration].
163. INTERNATIONAL BILL, supra note 135, at 1.
164. Declaration, supra note 164.
165. Id.
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at least 60,000 Kurds to flee the country and live in camps in Turkey
and Iran."
V. Suggestions for Change to Prevent a Repetition of the Kurdish
Massacres
Treaties addressing chemical weapons have been unsuccessful
because of their lack of effective verification and compliance provi-
sions. "" There is no force in international law to back them up. The
complacency of the international community has contributed to the
proliferation of chemical weapons and to their use. Applying interna-
tional pressure to nations engaging in chemical warfare is vitally im-
portant. The silence and lack of effective punishment have shown
countries that they can use chemical weapons without fear of retri-
bution. It is time for a new convention on chemical weapons.
The forty-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has,
since 1984, been debating the U.S. proposal to ban possession and
production of chemical weapons.'"6 The proposed draft treaty calls
for a comprehensive, effectively verifiable ban calling for mandatory
on-site inspections by an international body within forty-eight hours
of the alleged use of chemical weapons.' 69 The inspection provision
encompasses previously identified and declared production facilities,
as well as suspected production by private chemical industries. °7 0
A global ban is complicated and will not work unless there are
no nonsignatories who possess chemical weapons. A total ban will be
difficult to achieve because chemical weapons appeal to the Third
World.17 Chemical weapons are cheap and easy to use. 72 The U.S.
has stated that it will consider economic sanctions against nations
that refuse to go along with a total-ban treaty because such bans do
not work unless all nations comply. 173
Another problem with a total ban is verification. Only the pres-
ence of extraordinary security distinguishes a chemical weapons
plant from a pesticide factory or a pharmaceutical plant. 74 Unan-
nounced inspections, provided for in the convention, are necessary
because a chemical weapons plant can easily be converted into a le-
166. Haberman, supra note 36, at A6, col. 1.
167. HARRISON & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 16.
168. Smolowe, supra note 7, at 47.
169. HARRISON & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 35.
170. Id.
171. Third World countries do not want a repeat of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
that banned the spread of nuclear weapons but allowed developed countries to keep theirs. The
Reuters Library Report, Sept. 25, 1989 (LExis, Nexis library, Intl file).
172. Hydrochloric acid and thiodiglycol-a solvent used in ink-are all that is necessary
to make mustard gas, one of the gases the Iraqis used agaisnt the Kurds. Id.
173. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
174. Galloway, Bad Chemical Reaction, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 16, 1989,
at 30.
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gitimate private factory. A permanent organization to investigate
charges of chemical weapons production and use is also needed. The
delays inherent in investigating chemical warfare allegations would
be minimized by using a permanent organization, because its mem-
bers would be experienced in working together and in collecting sam-
ples efficiently. 17 5 Investigating and punishing treaty violations is
most crucial when a nation, such as Iraq, is engaged in a continuing
pattern of chemical warfare. If that nation is not stopped, other na-
tions will feel compelled to produce and possibly to use chemical
weapons for their own defense. 176
In the interim, the law should be strengthened to provide for the
supervision of chemical weapon use. Sanctions must be imposed
upon countries that use chemical weapons; these sanctions must be
imposed by a large number of countries or they will not be effec-
tive.17 7 Nations must voice their opposition to the use of chemical
weapons and must back up their words with actions.
The ban on the export of technology and of the chemicals neces-
sary to make poison gas must be enforced and more effective mea-
sures must be promulgated. Representatives of nineteen countries
have struggled to implement new export regulations to curb the
trade of chemicals. 178 In 1985, a Chemical Warning List was created
by the U.S. and several other countries to help countries identify and
avoid transactions which might enable countries to produce chemical
weapons.79 Success has been limited. 80 Some progress has been
made in stopping proliferation, but much remains to be done.
175. Note, supra note 9, at 280. One way to establish an organization for investigation
would be to expand the activities of an existing international organization, such as the Red
Cross, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or the World Health Organiza-
tion. Id. These organizations have access to parts of the world that others cannot enter. Unfor-
tunately, all three organizations have refused to help. Id. at 281.
176. That is exactly what occurred during the Iran-Iraq war. Iran developed chemical
weapons in response to Iraqi use. They also used small quantities of poison gas captured from
the Iraqis in 1987. Pear, Can Words Stem a Flow of Chemical Weapons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8,
1989, at E2, col. 3.
177. The world must decide whether and how to punish breaching nations. Lack of sanc-
tions in an international convention is not unusual because the options are limited. Id at 266-
267. Military sanctions are ineffective in areas, such as chemical weapons, that involve nuclear
powers. Id. at 166, n. 36. Also, the effectiveness of economic sanctions is questionable. There
are always countries who will trade with a sanctioned nation. The primary sanctions underly-
ing all arms control agreements are political in nature, "consisting of negative reactions from
the international community in which the noncomplying nation must continue to operate. Id.
at 267.
178. HARRISON & ROBERTS, supra note 3, at 51.
179. Id.
180. West Germany is a major source of Third World chemical systems. The sale of
chemical technology by West German and Japanese companies to Libya was exposed in 1988.
The Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. State Department prepared a secret report on
the role of West German chemical firms in Libya. Lief, The Uphill Fight to Contain Chemical
Weapons, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 9, 1989, at 42. A State Department official
says that West German companies have "assisted Iran, Iraq, and Syria in acquiring chemical-
weapons capability." Id.
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VI. Conclusion
The foregoing work was intended to survey international law
regulating chemical weapons and apply that law to the Iraqis brutal
use of chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds. It is clear that Iraq
has violated a number of conventions and rules, especially the hu-
manitarian laws. However, the Kurdish situation demonstrated the
glaring inadequacies of the current state of international law regu-
lating chemical weapons. The massacre of the Iraqi Kurds was a
horrible act. The world's silence made the massacre even more hor-
rific. This Comment was also meant to inform the world of the
Kurdish situation and of Iraq's guilt. Hopefully, with better informa-
tion and more conviction, nations will not allow history to repeat
itself.
Kristina M. Kurjiaka

